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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DELBERT F. ASTIN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : No. 950253-CA 
vs. : District Ct. No. 934402059 
MARGIE M. ASTIN, : Category 15 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
COMES NOW the Appellant to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "Wife"), by and through counsel, and hereby submits 
the following as her brief of Appellant herein: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2) (h) , and the provisions of Rules 
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. In 
particular, Wife appeals those provisions which awarded the Wife 
$600.00 per month alimony; failing to order Husband to sell the 
marital residence or pay out Wife's equity therein; the provisions 
wherein which the trial court denied the Wife's request that 
Husband pay one-half of uncovered medical expenses and insurance 
premiums upon the expiration of her health insurance COBRA 
coverage; the provision wherein which the trial court ordered the 
Husband to reimburse only one-half of the loans that Husband had 
taken out against the Wife's whole-life insurance policy and the 
award to Wife of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00, rather 
than more or all of those fees. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES. ETC. 
There is no case law authority, nor statutory authority 
believed by Wife to be wholly dispositive or wholly determinative 
of the issues raised on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of 
discretion standard. "Trial courts have considerable discretion to 
adjust divorcing parties' financial and property interests." 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah App. 1988), 
citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987). This 
court has stated that "[a]bsent a showing of clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an alimony or 
property award." Throckmorton, at 123, citing Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This divorce action was tried before the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, on the 2nd 
and 6th days of September, 1994, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, 
presiding. The judge, among other things, entered orders regarding 
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alimony, property distribution, insurance coverage, and attorney's 
fees. 
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law from which the Wife appeals, were signed and entered by the 
court on February 23, 1995. Said Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto, designated as 
Appendix "A" and "B", respectively. The trial court's written 
memorandum decision, dated October 7, 1994, is attached hereto and 
designated as Appendix "C." 
Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 1995. Wife appeals 
the trial court's alimony award, disposition of the parties' 
marital home, failure to award contribution to Wife's future health 
related expenses, failure to order Husband to restore Wife's life 
insurance policy, and award of attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on April 12, 1962 in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. %2, Index 111). 
The parties resided together continuously as Husband and Wife until 
the date of their separation, September, 1993. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, [^3, Index 111) . The parties had five 
children together, only one of which was a minor at the time of 
trial. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. f5, Index 111). 
The parties were married for thirty-three years. 
Wife was born September 3, 1941 and was fifty-two years of age 
at the date of trial. (Tr., pg. 66, lines 16-19, Index 193) . Wife 
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was twenty years of age when the parties were married. (Tr,. pg. 
74, lines 9-12, Index 201). 
Wife had, historically, been a homemaker and Husband the 
financial support of the family. (Tr., pg. 73, lines 13 - 25, pg. 
74, lines 1 - 8 , Index 200 - 201). At the time of trial, Wife was 
unemployed. (Tr., pg. 68, lines 3 - 9 , Index 195). Wife has been 
diagnosed as having depression and multiple personality disorder. 
(T£-/ P9- 55> lines 4-12, Index 182) . Wife was receiving $429.00 
per month in social security disability benefits at the time of 
trial. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)7, Index 110). 
Husband was employed by Prudential Insurance Company of America as 
an insurance agent and acted as an independent broker for other 
companies. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [^9, Index 
110) . 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Husband was 
awarded the custody of the remaining minor child and was awarded 
the child's social security benefit in the sum of $189.00 per 
month, which was received as a result of the Wife's disability and 
in lieu of any contribution by Wife to Husband for child support. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [^5, 1(10, Index 111, 108) . 
At the time of trial, Wife testified regarding her health and 
her physician, Dr. David Bennion, testified, that in his opinion, 
Wife was currently incapable of earning a living. (Tr., pg. 63, 
lines 12 - 14, Index 190) . The trial court found that Wife 
receives $429.00 per month in social security disability benefits 
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and that she had been diagnosed as having depression and multiple 
personality disorder, both of which are difficult to treat. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)8, Index 110) . Wife 
testified that she currently resided with her sister, but wanted to 
become independent and move into a home or apartment. (Tr. , pg. 
68, lines 16 - 19, Index 195). Her monthly expenses while living 
with her sister and paying no monies to her sister were testified 
to be $1,372.00, which would increase to, approximately, $2,758.00 
upon divorcing and moving from her sister's home. (Tr., pg. 71, 
lines 2 - 9 , Index 198). The trial court also found that the Wife 
had been insured under Husband's health insurance, through his 
employment, which, upon the parties' divorce, would convert to 
coverage under federal COBRA legislation at which time the monthly 
COBRA health insurance premium would be $300.00, thus increasing 
her monthly expenses. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law %6, 
Index 111, 110) . The lower court also found that although Wife was 
eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible upon 
receiving alimony. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^ 8, 
Index 110). 
At the time of trial, Husband testified that he was employed 
by Prudential Insurance Company of America as an insurance 
salesman. (Tr., pg. 13, lines 23 - 25, Index 140). Husband 
further testified that he acted as an independent broker for Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Utah, GEM Insurance, and Jackson National Life 
Insurance Company. (Tr., pg. 22, lines 7 - 10, Index 149). His 
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income for 1993 was $44,839 00, his income for 1992 was $63,074.00, 
and his income for 1991 was $49,062.00. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law [^9, Index 110, 109) . Husband testified that the 
1992 income was unusual in that an additional $19,000.00 was paid 
to him for sick pay earned in 1991 when he had triple bypass 
surgery. (Tr., pg. 20, lines 1 - 13, Index 147). 
Further, the Husband testified that he was capable of paying 
alimony of between $300.00 and $400.00 per month. (Tr., pg. 28, 
lines 12-15, Index 155). Husband testified that he had monthly 
expenses, including expenses attendant to his minor child and other 
children or relatives living in his home of $3,846.00, and that 
those expenses included the support of a grandchild and several 
adult children as well as himself and the parties' minor child. 
(Tr., pg. 30, lines 1 - 25, pg. 31, lines 1 - 20, Index 157, 158). 
In examining the Husband's monthly expenses, the trial court 
found that the Husband's reasonable monthly expenses were 
$1,900.00. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1l0, Index 
108). The trial court also found that Husband's average gross 
monthly income was $3,829.36, from which job expenses were paid 
resulting in a gross monthly income of $3,501.36 and net monthly 
income of $2,626.64. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law %9, 
Index 110, 109, 108, Memorandum Decision 1(16, Index 92 -93) . The 
trial court found that the Husband, after paying his $1,900.00 
expenses, had $726.64 remaining disposable income. (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law f^ 10# Index 108, Memorandum Decision, 
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117, Index 92). The trial court found that a reasonable amount of 
monthly alimony to be paid by Husband to Wife was $600.00. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 112, Index 107). 
The trial court found that the remaining minor child had two 
years left in high school and that to enable the child to continue 
to enjoy the same security and surroundings that it was reasonable 
that the Husband be awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the 
parties' marital residence until the child's graduation from high 
school or attaining the age of 18, whichever last occurred. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1l3, Index 107) . Wife 
testified that given the substantial equity in the home, that it 
was reasonable that the home be sold and that the parties divide 
the equity. (Tr., pg. 101, lines 12 - 16, Index 228). Wife 
testified that she had no funds of money from which to draw without 
the sale of the home and that she could not get into a home of her 
own without those funds. (Tr., pg. 101, lines 17 - 23, Index 
228) . 
The Wife testified that the Husband, a life insurance agent, 
had unilaterally taken loans against Wife's whole life insurance, 
of which she was an owner, and that in order to do so, Husband had 
forged her name and used the funds, during the course of the 
marriage, for purposes unknown to Wife and without consultation 
with Wife. (Tr., pg. 94, lines 4 - 22, Index 221) . Wife requested 
that the trial court order Husband to reimburse all monies borrowed 
from that whole life policy and unencumber the same. (Tr., pg. 
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95, lines 18-22, Index 222). The trial court awarded the policy 
to Wife and ordered the Husband to restore one-half of the value of 
the amounts that he borrowed from that whole life policy. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1(20, Index 104) . Wife was 
ordered to pay future premiums. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law 120, Index 104). 
At the time of trial Wife had requested that the trial court 
award a decree of separate maintenance rather than a decree of 
divorce because, upon the parties' divorce, her medical coverage as 
a spouse would not be available at little or no cost. (Tr., pg. 
71, lines 15 - 21, Index 198) . Upon the parties' divorce, Wife 
testified that her monthly health insurance premiums, under federal 
COBRA legislation, would be $300.00 per month. (Tr., pg. 71, lines 
15-21, Index 198). Further, Wife testified that after a period 
of three years, that COBRA coverage would no longer be available 
and she would be uninsured and uninsurable. (Tr., pg. 71, line 25, 
pg. 72, lines 1 - 6 , Index 198, 199) . The trial court denied 
Wife's request that a decree of separate maintenance be awarded 
rather than a divorce, indicating that it should not order Husband 
to stay married if Husband desired the divorce. (Finding's of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law %6, Index 111, 110) . Wife testified that it 
was reasonable that the court then order Husband to contribute to 
her monthly health insurance premiums upon the expiration of the 
COBRA coverage and participate in the payment of uncovered medical 
expenses at that date. (Tr., pg. 72, lines 9 - 15, Index 199). 
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However, the trial court found that the question of whether Wife 
would be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA 
insurance coverage was a matter of speculation and that the trial 
court would not address the issue at that time. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 1|23, Index 104) . The trial court indicated 
that Wife could petition the court for a modification of the Decree 
based upon a material change of circumstances, if she was uninsured 
at that time. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)23, Index 
103) . 
At the time of trial, the Wife testified as to her needs and 
abilities to pay attorney's fees. The Wife's counsel was permitted 
to proffer fees and that proffer was not objected to. (Tr., pg. 
118, lines 16-19, Index 244) . Wife's counsel proffered that fees 
and costs were $3,579.00. (Tr., pg. 118, lines 20 - 25, pg. 119, 
lines 1-14, Index 244, 245). Husband argued that neither party 
was capable of paying the other party's attorney's fees and that 
each should pay their own. (Tr., pg. 29, lines 18 - 22, Index 
156) . The trial court found that neither Husband nor Wife had the 
ability to pay significant fees. (Memorandum Decision i|21, Index 
90) . The trial court further found that though unopposed, that 
Wife had not submitted an affidavit regarding her attorney's hourly 
rates or itemization. (Memorandum Decision 121, Index 91). The 
trial court awarded judgment to Wife for her attorney's fees in the 
sum of $1,000.00. (Decree of Divorce [^16, Index 100). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The parties to this action were married for thirty-three 
years. Throughout that period Wife was a homemaker, raised five 
children, and supported Husband in his career pursuits. However, 
at the time of the parties' divorce, Wife was disabled, unable to 
obtain future employment, and financially destitute. Wife had the 
need for alimony in an amount greater than $600.00 per month, and 
Husband had the ability to pay the larger amount. Further, the 
trial court failed to equalize the parties' standards of living and 
did not attempt to maintain Wife in the standard of living that she 
enjoyed during the parties' marriage. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in refusing to order the 
immediate sale of the marital home or in ordering the Husband to 
refinance the home an pay out the Wife's equity. Wife had an 
immediate need for her one-half share of the equity in the home in 
order to meet her expenses and acquire a new residence. No cash 
assets existed in the marital estate. The parties' minor child was 
sixteen at the time of trial. There was no evidence that the 
Husband was financially unable to refinance the property and pay to 
Wife one-half of the equity. 
Further, because of the entry of the decree of divorce, Wife 
was no longer able to remain insured through Husband's employer. 
Wife was required to obtain health insurance through COBRA 
legislation at approximately $300.00 per month and will further 
become uninsurable when the COBRA coverage expires. Husband should 
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have been required to pay one-half of Wife's health insurance 
premiums incurred as a result of the parties' divorce as well as 
one-half of Wife's medical expenses incurred after the expiration 
of her COBRA coverage. Husband had originally stipulated that a 
Decree of Separate Maintenance could be granted (Tr., pg. 4, lines 
21 - 25, pg. 5, lines 1 - 8 , Index 131 -132) . In the course of the 
trial, however, the Husband withdrew the stipulation (Tr., pg. 212, 
lines 17-18, Index 247). 
Husband unilaterally took out loans against Wife's life 
insurance policy, which was Wife's sole and separate property. In 
order to obtain such loans, Husband forged Wife's signature. 
Husband did not consult nor notify Wife of the loans nor the manner 
in which the proceeds received from the loans were spent. Also, 
after the parties' separation Wife was financially unable to make 
the premium payments on the policy and an additional loan was taken 
against the policy for reimbursement of premium payments by the 
insurance carrier. Thus, at the time of divorce Wife had an 
insurance policy worth merely $1,400 cash value, which had 
previously had an $8,000.00 cash value. The court erred and abused 
its discretion in not ordering Husband to reimburse the policy 
fully. 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award Wife's 
attorney's fees in the amount requested. The fees requested were 
reasonable based on the length and complexity of the case, were at 
a level consistent with that charged by similarly trained and 
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experienced attorney's in the area, and were not objected to by 
Husband's counsel. The trial court awarded only $1,000. This 
award should be reversed and Wife should be awarded judgment 
against Husband for attorney's fees in the amount requested at 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING WIFE ALIMONY IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $600.00, CONSIDERING WIFE'S NEEDS, 
HUSBAND'S ABILITY TO PAY, EQUALIZATION OF THE PARTIES' 
INCOME, AND THE PARTIES STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE 
MARRIAGE. 
Although a new alimony statute has been enacted by the Utah 
State Legislature, at the time of trial in this matter, the prior 
law was controlling, which states that ff [w] hen a decree of divorce 
is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties." 
§30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
This statute allows considerable discretion to be given to the 
trial court. However, certain standards have been set forth by the 
Utah appellate courts, especially with regard to long-term 
marriages such as the marriage in the case at hand. 
"Utah courts have held that "[a]n alimony award should, after 
a marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993), 
citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); see 
12 
also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 
489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). 
"In light of this goal, the trial court must consider: '(1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income; and 
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.'" 
Godfrey, at 589, quoting Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1075, Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 
App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 
1989) . "Failure to consider these factors in fashioning an alimony 
award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Godfrey, at 589, citing 
Bell, 810 P.2d at 492. 
In the instant case, Wife requested alimony in the amount of 
$1,400.00 per month, however the trial court awarded alimony to the 
Wife in the amount of $600.00 per month. The parties had enjoyed 
a thirty-three year marriage in which they lived comfortably. 
Husband had earned $44,839.00; $63,074.00; and $49,062.00, 
respectively, during three years immediately preceding the parties' 
separation. After separation, Husband continued to live in the 
marital residence and at or near the standard of living he enjoyed 
during the marriage; Wife's financial situation declined 
considerably. Wife was required to live with her sister to meet 
her monthly expenses. Temporary alimony was ordered at $1,000.00 
per month (R.Q.A., 22). 
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Wife's financial situation and needs dictated a greater 
alimony award than the $600.00 amount awarded by the trial court. 
The trial court found Wife's monthly income to be $429.00 and 
monthly expenses to be $1,372.00 at the time of trial. However, 
the court noted that the Wife was living with her sister at the 
time and desired to live on her own, which would necessarily 
require her to incur greater monthly expenses. Wife testified 
those expenses would increase to $2,758.00 upon finding a home of 
her own (Tr., pg. 71, lines 2 - 9 , Index 198). Certainly such a 
disparity between income and expenses requires a greater alimony 
award. 
Further, Wife suffers from a disability: depression and 
multiple personality disorder, which prevent her from obtaining 
employment. Wife's disability, combined with the fact that she has 
basically been a homemaker for thirty-three years and has no 
marketable skills, certainly preclude her from producing a 
sufficient income to support herself. 
Husband had the ability to pay an amount greater than the 
$600.00 award. The trial court found Husband's monthly net income 
to be $2,626.64 and monthly expenses to be $1,900.00. These 
expenses included those incurred for him and the parties' minor 
child, whose custody was awarded to Husband. The trial court 
further awarded Husband the $189.00 received by the minor child 
through Social Security as child support. This amount is received 
by the child pursuant to the Wife's disability. Accordingly, 
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pursuant to the trial court's findings, after adding Husband's 
monthly income ($2626.64) and the child's Social Security benefit 
received ($189.00), Husband has total net monthly income of 
$2,815.64. After deducting Husband's monthly expenses ($1,900.00), 
Husband has excess monthly income of $915.64. 
It is important to note that the court in analyzing the 
appropriate level of alimony acknowledged that Husband had $726.64 
net disposable remaining after he paid expenses. The court failed 
to include the additional $189.00 in social security Husband 
received each month in analyzing the Husband's true net income 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, flO, Index 108, 
Memorandum Decision, fl7, Index 92) . In comparison, Wife's monthly 
income, pursuant to the trial court's findings, is $429.00. Wife's 
monthly expenses, even without considering any extra expense 
incurred to move from her sister's home, are $1,372.00. Thus, 
after deducting Wife's monthly expenses from her monthly income, 
Wife still has a $943.00 shortfall. 
The trial court awarded Wife $600.00 per month in alimony. 
Even including this award, Wife has a shortfall of $343.00, while 
Husband retains $315.64 in excess of his monthly expenses. 
Certainly this cannot be said to be an equalization of the parties' 
income and there was no attempt to maintain wife at the standard of 
living the Wife had experienced prior to the parties' divorce. 
Further, the court did not award sufficient alimony to allow 
the Wife to move from her sisters' home. Wife testified that she 
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was living with her sister at the time of trial. Wife further 
testified that her sister allowed Wife to live with her without 
paying rent or other expenses. However, Wife testified that she 
desired to live independently. The living arrangements with Wife's 
sister were intended to be on a temporary basis. Wife testified 
that in order to live in her own apartment, Wife's monthly expenses 
would increase to $2,758.00 (Tr. , pg. 71, lines 2 - 9 , Index 198). 
Thus, increasing the disparity between Wife's income and earnings 
to a shortfall of $1,729.00. Finally, because Wife would no longer 
be able to obtain insurance coverage through Husband's employment, 
Wife's monthly expenses increased another $300.00 for health 
insurance coverage under federal COBRA legislation. Hence, after 
the divorce Wife had an income of $1,029.00 and expenses of 
$3,058.00 per month. Wife's shortfall was then $2,029.00. 
The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently overruled trial court decisions which award inadequate 
levels of alimony in long-term marriages. In Martinez v. Martinez, 
818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991), the Court held that fl[i]n some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to equalize the 
spouses' respective standards of living." The Court held that when 
a marriage is of long duration and one spouse helps the other to 
increase their earning capacity, it may be appropriate to make a 
"compensating adjustment" in dividing property and determining 
alimony. Id. at 542. 
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In Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988), the 
Court held that "the ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony 
award is whether, given all of these factors, the party receiving 
alimony will be able to support him or herself as nearly as 
possible to the standard of living . . . enjoyed during marriage." 
Id., at 1147. The Court also held that where the marriage is of 
long duration and one spouse's earning capacity greatly exceeds 
that of another, it is appropriate to order alimony at a level 
proportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage. Id. at 1147. 
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), in 
a marriage in excess of 30 years, the trial court awarded $1,000.00 
per month alimony for five years and reducing thereafter. The 
Appellate Court, in analyzing the appropriate considerations, 
determined that "the trial court's alimony award was inequitable, 
both in terms of the initial amount and the graduated diminution 
over time. The wife is in her mid-fifties, possesses few 
marketable job skills and has little hope of retraining." id. at 
1076. "The original award must be more substantial, considering 
the husband's real discretionary income, and should continue at 
that level for the foreseeable future." Id. at 1076. 
In the case of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), 
the trial court had awarded alimony at the rate of $1,200.00 per 
month and the wife had appealed. The Appellate Court agreed that 
the alimony award was insufficient and inequitable. JEd. at 1081. 
The Court went on to state that given the wife's monthly expenses 
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and needs and her limited future earning potential, the alimony 
award was insufficient to equalize the parties's standard of 
living. Id. at 1081. 
In the case of Higley v. Hicrley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court of Utah found that the trial court's award to the 
wife of $100.00 per month permanent alimony was a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. at 382. The Court in that 
case, also indicated that it is within the purview of the Appellate 
Court to make a modification of the decree and not necessarily 
remand it for entry of a modified judgment by the trial court, if 
adequate record exists from which to make that determination. Id. 
at 382. In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), the 
Appellate Court did amend the alimony award from $400.00 per month 
to $750.00 per month without remand, given that the trial court had 
clearly abused its discretion and the amount of alimony was 
inadequate to meet the wife's monthly needs. Id. at 75. Again, in 
the case of Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), the 
Appellate Court found that in a thirty plus year marriage with a 
wife of approximately 50 years of age, that a monthly alimony award 
of $1,800.00 was inadequate and did not come close to equalizing 
the parties' standard of living and that the award was clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 1213. 
It is clear from the holding of the courts in the referenced 
cases that the Wife's alimony in this matter should be reconsidered 
and that the court should modify the award appropriately. The Wife 
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in this case is in her fifties, has no substantial work experience 
and has been a homemaker since the age of 20. She devoted her time 
and effort to raising the parties' five children and support 
Husband in his employment. Further, there is a significant 
impediment to her ability to obtain employment and provide 
financial support for herself due to her debilitating mental and 
emotional illness. Consequently, the Wife's financial situation 
and her need for alimony, combined with her inability to provide 
income for herself and the husband's ability to pay, even as 
articulated in the findings of the trial court, the $600.00 per 
month alimony award should be reversed and modified by this court. 
II. THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED SOLD AT 
THE TIME OF DIVORCE, WITH THE EQUITY IN THE SAME DIVIDED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IMMEDIATELY OR HUSBAND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN REQUIRED TO "BUY OUT" WIFE'S INTEREST IN THE HOME. 
The financial situation of the parties in this matter were 
such that an immediate sale of the marital home or payment by 
Husband of Wife's equity would be equitable and would assist in 
placing Wife in a position in which she would have a greater 
ability to provide for herself independently. 
The factors considered in fashioning an equitable property 
division are as follows: 
11
 [T]he amount and kind of property to be divided; whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; 
the source of the property; the health of the parties; 
the parties' standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of 
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' 
ages at time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties 
gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship 
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the property division has with the amount of alimony and 
child support to be awarded." 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990); citing Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, the marital home was acquired during the 
parties' marriage. Wife is in poor health and is suffering from a 
debilitating disability, and the parties' standard of living prior 
to the divorce was comfortable. Further, Wife's financial 
condition since the entry of the decree, as stated above, has 
worsened considerably. Wife has a shortfall in meeting her monthly 
expenses by an amount over $1,000. Wife is financially unable to 
live in her own apartment and must reside with her sister. On the 
other hand, Husband's financial situation has not changed 
considerably since the entry of the divorce. 
This is a thirty-three year marriage in which both parties 
have expended considerable time and effort. As discussed above, 
Wife is not in a situation in which she has the ability to provide 
an income for herself. The only means by which Wife may be able to 
provide herself with her own residence is by immediately receiving 
her one-half equity in the marital home to apply to a new 
residence. The trial court in this matter not only awarded an 
alimony award which was insufficient to permit Wife to meet her 
monthly expenses, the court also did not allow immediate sale of 
the property to allow Wife to obtain her share of the equity which 
would help her meet those expenses. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that lf[t]he overriding 
consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable - that 
property be fairly divided between the parties, given their 
contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the 
time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). 
Certainly the court's refusal to order the sale of the marital 
home or to order Husband to pay to Wife her portion of the equity 
in the home was not equitable. Both parties contributed 
significantly to the marriage, Husband in terms of financial 
support and family support, and Wife in terms of homemaking and 
raising the parties' five children. Additionally, the parties' 
circumstances at the time of the divorce require sale of the 
marital home or immediate division of that asset. Although it is 
often the trial court's desire to allow the party with custody of 
minor children to remain in the marital home while the children 
complete their schooling, the situation in this matter is 
different. The parties' minor child was a teenager rather than a 
small child. The child was about to begin her junior year in high 
school. This was not a situation in which a move from the marital 
home would require the child to lose all contact with neighborhood 
friends and school classmates. The parties' minor child would have 
a driver's license and a car and the ability to continue to 
associate with friends and attend the same school. Further, the 
parties' other children had reached their majority age and had the 
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ability to reside on their own. Accordingly, the fact that Husband 
has custody of the parties' minor child should not be determinative 
in the decision regarding whether to immediately sell the marital 
home. Further, there was no evidence that Husband did not have the 
financial wherewithal to refinance the home and pay out the Wife's 
share of the marital equity. 
An equitable division of the property required the immediate 
sale of the marital home, or an order that Husband refinance the 
home and with one-half of the equity to be distributed to Wife, it 
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to do so. 
III. HUSBAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PAY ONE-HALF OF 
WIFE'S MEDICAL EXPENSES AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS. 
Wife's disabilities require continuous medical treatment. As 
a result of the parties' divorce, Wife is no longer able to obtain 
health insurance through Husband's employer. Wife is also 
ineligible for Medicare benefits as a result of receiving alimony. 
Accordingly, Wife's only option is to convert the coverage she 
received through Husband's employer under federal COBRA 
legislation. However, the cost of such monthly premium is 
substantial. Under COBRA, Wife's monthly health insurance premium 
is $300.00. This amounts to nearly thirty per cent of Wife's total 
monthly income ($459 social security and $600 alimony). 
Additionally, after Wife's COBRA coverage expires, approximately 
three years after the parties' divorce, Wife will become 
uninsurable. 
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The parties' divorce endangers Wife's future health. Wife's 
medical problems include depression and multiple personality 
disorder. Such disabilities require treatment throughout the 
foreseeable future. Treatment for these disabilities is expensive. 
Prescription expenses alone for Wife are $385.23 per month, 
average. (See Defendant's Exhibit #10.) In addition to the 
psychiatric illness, Wife also had coronary artery bypass surgery. 
(See Tr. , pg. 56, lines 13-18, Index 183.) Testimony was also 
received that the Wife had past health conditions which included 
ulcer, colitis, headache, reflux esophagitis, vertigo, peptic ulcer 
disease, high cholesterol and that she had previously had a 
hysterectomy. (Tr., pg. 57, lines 16-19, Index 184.) 
Wife is financially unable to pay for COBRA insurance coverage 
or her medical expenses after such coverage expires. Such 
financial difficulty has been created solely as a result of this 
divorce action and Wife's resulting inability to obtain health 
insurance through Husband's employer. Husband is in a financially 
healthier position than wife and has the ability to contribute to 
such payments. Accordingly, it is fair and equitable that Husband 
should be required to contribute one-half of Wife's health 
insurance premiums, and when the same become unavailable, to 
contribute one-half to Wife's medical expenses. It is clear from 
the record that Husband chose not to allow a decree of separate 
maintenance to be awarded (Tr. pg. 121, lines 17-18, Index 247), 
and has thus, caused the additional expenses in premiums and 
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ultimately in uncovered medical expenses to be incurred. Certainly 
the trial court should have required the Husband to contribute to 
those expenses and it was error and an abuse of discretion to fail 
to consider those expenses either in the sharing of the expenses or 
in a greater award of alimony to cover those expenses. The trial 
court's failure will result in wife becoming a public charge, which 
is contrary to outstanding case law. (See, English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409 [Utah 1977] and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 [Utah App. 
1990].) The end result is a division of the marital estate and 
monies which is inequitable to wife and contrary to Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 (1953, as amended). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING HUSBAND TO 
REIMBURSE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE LOANS TAKEN AGAINST WIFE'S 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY. 
During the marriage Wife obtained a life insurance policy 
which had a cash value of approximately $8,000.00. However, during 
the course of the marriage Husband took out various loans against 
Wife's life insurance policy. Wife was the sole owner of the 
policy and was not consulted or notified about the loan. In order 
to cash the checks for the loans made against the policy, Husband 
forged Wife's name (Tr., pg. 94, lines 4-25, Index 221) . Due to 
the loans taken by Husband against the policy, the policy had only 
a $1,400.00 cash value at the time of the parties' divorce rather 
than an $8,000.00 value (Tr. pg. 95, lines 1-23, Index 222, See 
also Defendant's Exhibits No. 16 and 17). 
24 
Wife requested that Husband be required to reimburse the 
policy to the cash value it was worth prior to his unilateral 
decision to take out loans against it. The trial court ordered 
Husband to reimburse only one-half of all loans he borrowed against 
the policy without Wife's permission, thus restoring only one-half 
of its value (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1(20, Index 
20) . 
This is a case in which Wife was the sole owner of her own 
life insurance policy. Without her consent and without her 
knowledge, Husband took loans against Wife's policy and forged 
Wife's name to do so. Wife has no personal knowledge of the manner 
in which the loaned sums were spent and was not consulted in any 
way concerning disbursement of these sums. 
Further, this was a long-term marriage in which Wife was not 
employed. When the parties' separated Wife had no means with which 
to make her monthly premium payments on the insurance policy. 
Accordingly, the policy went into default and the insurance company 
took a loan against the proceeds to compensate for Wife's failure 
to make premium payments (Tr. , pg. 95, lines 1 -23, Index 222). 
Again, the "overriding consideration" of the court should be 
that the division of the marital estate be fair, given the 
contributions of the parties during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the divorce. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 
(Utah App. 1990). Due to Husband's unilateral and questionable act 
of taking loans against the policy, Husband should have been 
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required to reimburse all loans against the policy and in order to 
make Wife whole. 
3L. WIFE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REIMBURSED FOR ALL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED IN THIS ACTION AND THE COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN TAILING TO AWARD WIFE HER FEES. 
At trial, Wife's counsel proffered that she was an attorney 
duly licensed in good standing in the State of Utah and that she 
had reviewed her time and billing records for legal services 
provided in connection with the divorce proceedings. She proffered 
her hourly rate at $150.00 and travel time hourly rate at $75.00. 
Wife's counsel testified that the total fees anticipated with 
follow-up would be $3,579.00 and that those fees were necessary and 
reasonably incurred given the difficulty of the case and the 
special needs of the Wife (Tr., pg. 118, lines 20 - 25, Index 244, 
pg. 119, lines 1 - 2 5 , Index 245, and pg. 120, lines 1 -4, Index 
246) . It is equitable that Wife should have been awarded fees in 
this amount and not $1,000.00 as awarded by the trial court. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3, (1953, as amended) states that !I[t]he 
district court has discretion to order either party to pay the 
other party's attorney fees in a divorce action." See also, Muir 
v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992), citing Mauahan v. 
Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 145, 162 (Utah App. 1989). 
When awarding attorney's fees, "the trial court must find (1) 
the requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the 
requested fees are reasonable; and (3) the other spouse has the 
ability to pay". Muir, at 741, citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 
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836, 840 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425 
(Utah App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
In this matter, Wife is undoubtedly in need of financial 
assistance. Husband is in a much better financial position to pay 
Wife's attorney's fees and has the ability to do so, even if the 
same must be done on a payment rather than lump-sum basis. 
Additionally, the requested fees were reasonable. In Muir, 
this Court stated as follows: 
"In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the 
court may consider the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved.ff 
Muir, at 741, quoting Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah 
App. 1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1985)) . 
This was a complex case involving in-depth research, discovery 
and expertise. Difficult legal issues were broached, such as the 
possibility to obtain a decree of separate maintenance rather than 
divorce, the effects of Wife's depression and multiple personality 
disorder, and the difficulties involved when dividing the marital 
estate after a thirty-three year marriage. 
It is also important to note that Husband did not object to 
Wife's counsel's proffer of attorney's fees and merely argued that 
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each party should pay their own fees. The trial court, however, 
specifically referred to the fact that Wife had not submitted an 
affidavit regarding the attorney's fees and had only proffered the 
same on the record. However, the submission of an affidavit of 
attorney's fees is not a prerequisite to the ability to award 
attorney's fees in a divorce action. In a similar fact situation, 
the court in Muir v.Muir, 841 P. 2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992) 
allowed wife's attorney to proffer testimony regarding the amount 
and reasonableness of attorney's fees. Husband's attorney did not 
object. The court found that wife incurred $15,000.00 in legal 
fees, but ordered husband to only pay $3,000.00 of those fees. The 
trial court offered no explanation for the reduction. Although the 
court had made general findings regarding husband's income, it made 
no findings specifically regarding husband's ability to pay wife's 
attorney's fees. The court held, in Muir, that because the 
proffered evidence of wife's attorney fees was adequate and 
entirely undisputed, the court abused its discretion in reducing 
the requested amount from a sum of more than $15,000 to only $3,000 
without a finding that the reduction was warranted by one of the 
established factors. 
"Where "the evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
requested attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed, 
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the 
amount requested unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more 
28 
of the established factors." Muir, at 741, quoting Martindale v. 
Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App. 1989). 
Wife's attorney's fees were proffered on the record at the 
time of trial and were not objected to. Such fees, as discussed 
above, were adequate and undisputed. Each of the factors for 
establishing a reasonable award of attorney's fees were met. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only 
$1,000 in attorney's fees. Thus this court should modify the award 
and award the wife her fees of $3,579.00. 
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD AWARD WIFE FEES AND COST 
ON APPEAL. 
It is clear from the Statement of Facts, that the Wife in this 
case is in need of assistance and unable to meet her obligations 
without assistance from Husband. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1953, as amended), provides for the 
award of attorney's fees and costs. Either party to a divorce 
action may be ordered to pay attorney's fees, including attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal. See, Maughn v. Mauahn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 
App. 1989) . It is appropriate and ordinary that when fees in a 
divorce have been awarded below to the party who then prevails on 
appeal, fees should be awarded to that party on appeal. Crouse v. 
Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). 
Based upon the foregoing it is reasonable that this court, 
given the record below, find Wife entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal and costs. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its 
decision to award Wife only $600.00 per month alimony. The Court 
should modify the award. The trial court further erred and abused 
its discretion in its refusal to order the immediate sale and 
distribution of equity of the parties' marital home or in the 
alternative that Husband buy out Wife's interest in the home. The 
trial court's failure to order Husband to reimburse one-half of 
Wife's health insurance premiums and medical expenses should be 
reversed as an abuse of discretion. The trial court's failure to 
order Husband to repay the loans against the Wife's life insurance 
policy was an abuse of discretion and should be modified by this 
court. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in its award 
to Wife of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00 and this court 
should modify the trial court's order and award Wife her fees of 
$3,579.00. Further, Wife should be awarded her costs and fees on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this y^-^qay of August, 1995. 
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1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Utah 
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2. The court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant intermarried on the 12th day of 
April, 1962, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The court finds that the parties separated in September of 1993 and that, 
pursuant to a temporary order of Judge Steven Hansen of the Fourth Judicial District Court on 
January 20, 1994, Plaintiff has been paying Defendant $1,000.00 per month in temporary 
support. 
4. The court finds that the parties have developed irreconcilable differences, 
making it impossible to continue living together or to continue the marital relationship and that 
Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Defendant and Defendant is entitled to a 
decree of divorce from the Plaintiff. 
5. The court finds that five children were born as issue to the marriage but that 
only one child is a minor, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978. The court finds that Plaintiff 
should be awarded the care, custody and control of said minor child, subject to the right of the 
Defendant to visit with said child at reasonable times and places. 
6. The court finds that Defendant amended her Counterclaim to request a decree 
of separate maintenance in order to avoid additional expenses attendant to the health insurance 
premium, which would increase to $300.00, and the eventual termination of her COBRA 
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coverage and potential uninsurability. The court finds that it should not order Plaintiff to stay 
married, and as Plaintiff desires that a decree of divorce be granted, that the same should be 
granted and that a decree of separate maintenance should not be granted to Defendant. 
7. The court finds that Defendant is currently incapable of earning a living, 
although this could change if a proper treatment is found, but Defendant does appear incapable 
of earning a living in the forseeable future. Defendant receives $429.00 per month in Social 
Security Disability benefits. 
8. The court finds that Defendant has been diagnosed as having depression and 
multiple personality disorder, both of which are difficult to treat. Furthermore, Defendant had 
coronary bypass surgery in 1993. Defendant is taking a variety of medications. The court 
further finds that, so long as Defendant is insured, her monthly expense for prescription 
copayments is $76.19; without insurance Defendant's average monthly expense for prescription 
would be $385.23. The court finds that, upon the divorce being entered, Defendant will be 
insured under a COBRA plan which is good for only three years, at which time Defendant may 
be uninsurable. Defendant's monthly COBRA health insurance premium is $300.00. Although 
Defendant is eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible upon receiving 
alimony. 
9. The court finds that Plaintiff is employed by Prudential Insurance Company 
of America as an insurance salesman and acts as an independent broker for Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Utah, Gem Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. His taxable 
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income for the past three years was as follows: (a) $44,839.00 in 1993; (b) $63,074.00 in 1992; 
and (c) $49,062.00 in 1991. The court finds that the 1992 income was unique in that it reflects 
sick pay received as a result of Plaintiff's incapacitation by reason of triple by-pass surgery 
which prohibited his employer from applying $19,100.00 renewal income to his 1991 income, 
resulting in Plaintiff's 1992 income being disproportionate to his actual earnings and that 
$19,100.00 should be deducted. After deducting the disproportionate income, the court finds 
that the average annual income from 1991 through 1993 is found to be $45,958.33 per month, 
giving Plaintiff an average monthly income of $3,829.36. The court finds that Plaintiff alleges 
that job expenses averaging $7,865.00 annually ($655.00 per month) should be backed out of 
his gross monthly wages because it would not show up on income taxes as gross income if he 
were an independent agent. Plaintiff testified of these monthly expenses, but did not break them 
down as to what they covered, nor did Plaintiff's attorney address this in Plaintiff's Proposed 
Findings of Fact. However, in 1991, 1992, and 1993, Plaintiff filed Form 2106 along with his 
Internal Revenue tax return, alleging employee business expense. The court finds that Plaintiff 
does have employee business expenses necessarily incurred in the production of Plaintiff's 
monthly income, and farther finds that these expenses appear exaggerated. The court will allow 
one-half of such expenses or $328.00 per month, as a reduction against Plaintiff's gross income 
for determination of his net income for the purposes of determining the amount of alimony to 
be awarded to Defendant. Plaintiff is not an independent agent, and does not assume the same 
risks and expenses as an independent agent, and the court has therefore reduced the monthly 
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employee business expense claimed by Plaintiff. The court must take the parties as it finds 
them; accordingly, the court will deduct these job expenses from Plaintiff's average monthly 
income and finds Plaintiff's average gross monthly income to be $3,501.36. An average of 
Plaintiff's income withholding the federal, state and social security taxes during the years 1991 
through 1994 is $875.72. (See W-2 forms and Exhibits 1-3.) After deducting this amount from 
Plaintiffs average gross monthly income, the court finds Plaintiffs net average monthly income 
is $2,626.64. 
10. The court finds that Plaintiff's voluntary support of the parties' adult children 
and their grandchild should not be a factor in determining the appropriate amount of alimony 
awarded to Defendant. The court finds that Plaintiff's stated monthly expenses can and should 
be reduced when determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to Defendant and that, after 
the appropriate reduction, that would be $1,900.00. The court finds that when this amount is 
deducted from Plaintiff's net average monthly income of $2,626.00, Plaintiff would have 
$726.64 remaining. In so finding, the court further finds that these calculations are not precise 
and it is impossible to come up with a perfect solution or amount. 
11. The court finds it inappropriate to attempt to calculate child support for the 
parties' minor child based upon the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the child receives 
social security in the amount of $189.00 per month as a result of Defendant's disability. Since 
Defendant is not in a position to contribute any sum for child support, the court finds and 
concludes that the amount coming from social security, together with Defendant's obligation to 
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support the minor child, is significantly reflected in Plaintiff's monthly expenses. For these 
reasons, the court finds that an independent amount of child support should not be considered 
when determining the parties' monthly expenses or the amount of alimony awarded to 
Defendant. 
12. The court finds that, based upon Plaintiff's net average monthly income of 
$2,984.64 and Defendant's net average monthly income of $429.00 and based upon the parties 
needs and responsibilities, a reasonable amount of alimony would be $600.00 per month. 
13. The court finds that the minor daughter, Emily, has two years left in high 
school and that, to enable Emily to continue to enjoy the same security and surroundings that 
her siblings have enjoyed during their minority, it is reasonable and appropriate that Plaintiff be 
awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the home until Emily graduates from high school with 
her class or turns 18, whichever occurs last. 
14. The court finds that during Plaintiffs exclusive use and benefit of the home, 
he should make timely mortgage payments, pay the taxes, and maintain the home in its present 
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted and, upon Emily's graduation from high school 
with her class or reaching the age of 18, whichever occurs last, the home should be sold at the 
highest price available and, after paying the mortgage payments and the balance of the debts and 
obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation, that the then net equity should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
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±iie OMr unds thai :h; debts and obligations exisi-iL a; . i , • e 
parties* separatio- "ncluded the tol 
Credi^oi Balance 
1 •- iMoma.sSore.nsen ., . • $ 2.i?9.uO 
" --irst Security Bank (1st mortgage) 31,169.00 
3 * c:e—.r - Bank (home equity loan) 30,049.00 
4 , ' " 
j -^di\ Care Center (VisaI 2,857.w 
6. Credit Card Center (Mastnl ard) 2,959.00 
7. First Interstate Bank (Master Card I 1,215.00 
• 16. • The court finds that the parties have divided the personal property and each 
should be awarded the personalty now in their respectivt* possessions, li,|( '"'v"1 ihv following 
adjustments should tic made 
a. Plaintiff should return to the Defendant flu hiilc tabic and iv\u m h.uis 
from the kitchen; the radio g;... *:./• ^- ^ ' e same); sewing equipment 
' " • Lunut cover; shower rod c ! . M ; \ : - •: m^ oram *»w ^nita 
< rrs if Piainuff has them); newest brown wee N^nc a^ . •* .- - jcn 
school books Plaintiff may have asocial* ; ,,VSK m - • - *U 
bedroom; crafts and quilts thai Marge made ur Plaintiff ria.s n^no. U;K: I-U*:; 
his every best effort to ha\e • • • • < ! iioia his sister and deliver th-- same 
to fkdVniiani" Defendant's Book of Remembrance; and make available all family pictures in his 
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possession to the Defendant for copying and, after said copying, said items should be returned 
to the Plaintiff. 
b. Defendant should return to the Plaintiff, the following: temple 
clothing; missionary memorabilia (if Defendant has); any and all pictures and family 
memorabilia that Defendant has should be made available to Plaintiff for copying and, upon 
copying, the Plaintiff should return the same to the Defendant. 
17. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to certain retirement benefits through 
the Prudential Insurance Group and that each party is entitled to one-half of said retirement 
benefits. Any qualified domestic relations order should be prepared to divide those retirement 
benefits. 
18. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to claim the minor child as an 
exemption for income tax purposes. 
19. The court finds that the 1989 Oldsmobile has a value of $4,425.00 and that 
the 1985 Dodge Truck has a value of $2,475.00. The court finds that it is reasonable and 
appropriate that the Oldsmobile should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that the Dodge Truck 
should be awarded to the Defendant but that, to equalize the values, Plaintiff should pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $975.00. The court further finds that the 1987 Mercury is not operable 
and that it should be sold at whatever price it can be sold for and the proceeds should be divided 
equally between the parties. 
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20. The court finds that Plaintiff should maintain the $153,000.00 Prudential Life 
Insurance policy on his life and that the beneficiaries should remain the same, with Defendant 
being the beneficiary of $53,000.00 and the children being the beneficiary of $100,000.00. The 
court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford further term insurance. The court further finds that 
Plaintiff has made loans against the policy that of which Defendant is the owner, contract 
number 70810865, without the knowledge or permission of the Defendant and Plaintiff should 
restore to the policy of Defendant, one-half of the value of said loans. Defendant should be 
responsible for making any and all premiums on said policy henceforth. 
21. The court finds that Plaintiff has the equitable ownership of two burial plots 
in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was buried, and 
Plaintiff should make one of said plots available to the Defendant. 
22. The court finds that Plaintiff should pay the debt owing to Thomas W. 
Sorensen and that Defendant should pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G. 
Anderson, M.D. 
23. Defendant argues that each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all 
monthly health insurance premiums and one-half of all uncovered medical expenses incurred 
after the expiration of Defendant's COBRA coverage and if she is unable to secure other health 
insurance. Whether Defendant will be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA 
insurance coverage is a matter of speculation and the court will not address this issue at this 
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time. Should this possibility become reality, Defendant may petition the court for a modification 
of the divorce decree based upon a material change of circumstances. 
24. The Plaintiff previously deducted from Defendant's alimony payment, one-
half of the tax liability of the parties for 1993. Defendant has requested a judgment against 
Plaintiff and the court finds that it should be denied and that the deduction from temporary 
alimony was reasonable. The court further finds that Defendant has made a claim for expenses 
incurred at the time of separation as a result of checks that bounced when Plaintiff closed out 
the parties' joint account. The Defendant's request in that regard should be denied. 
25. The court finds that Defendant's request is reasonable and appropriate to have 
her maiden name restored and she shall henceforth be known as Marjorie Marchand. 
26. The court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has the ability to pay 
significant attorneys fees and, although Plaintiff is obligated for his own attorneys fees, the court 
finds Plaintiff should contribute to Defendant's attorneys fees in the sum of $1,000.00. 
The court having made in writing its findings of fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Defendant and Defendant 
is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Plaintiff, the same to become final upon the signing 
and entry in the registry of actions. 
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2. Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child 
of the parties, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978, subject to the right of the Defendant to 
visit with said child at reasonable times and places. 
3. Defendant has no child support obligation to the Plaintiff, based upon 
Plaintiff's entitlement to $189.00 per month Social Security because of Defendant's disability. 
4. Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant as alimony, the sum of $600.00 per 
month, commencing in the month of October 1994 and continuing on a monthly basis until the 
further order of the court. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled the exclusive use and benefit of the home of the parties 
until such time as the minor child, Emily, reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school, 
whichever occurs last. 
6. During Plaintiffs exclusive use and benefit of the home, he should make all 
mortgage payments, pay the taxes, and maintain the home in its present condition, reasonable 
wear and tear excepted and, upon Emily's graduation from high school or reaching the age of 
18, whichever occurs last, the home should be sold at the highest price available and after 
paying the mortgage payments and the debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties' 
separation, the then net equity should be divided equally between the parties. 
7. The debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation 
included the following, with the following amounts: 
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Creditor Balance 
1. Dr. Thomas Sorensen $ 2,159.00 
2. First Security Bank (1 st mortgage) 31,169.00 
3. First Security Bank (home equity loan) 30,049.00 
4. Sears 1,503.00 
5. Credit Card Center (Visa) 2,857.00 
6. Credit Card Center (MasterCard) 2,959.00 
7. First Interstate Bank (MasterCard) 1,215.00 
8. Discover (credit card) 1,308.00 
8. The personalty and properties as divided by the parties is affirmed, with the 
adjustments described in the foregoing findings. 
9. Each party is entitled to one-half of Plaintiffs retirement benefits through 
Prudential Insurance Group. 
10. The court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to claim the minor child as an 
exemption for income tax purposes. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1989 Oldsmobile and Defendant should be 
awarded the 1985 Dodge Truck, but Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, the sum of $975.00 to 
equalize the values. The 1987 Mercury should be sold at whatever price it can be sold for and 
the proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
12. Plaintiff should maintain the life insurance on his life and the beneficiaries 
should remain the same. Defendant is entitled to the policy in which she has incidents of 
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ownership and PlaintiflF should restore one-half of the value of the loans he has made against said 
policy without the knowledge or permission of the Defendant. 
13. Plaintiff should make available to the Defendant, one of the plots in the Salt 
Lake City Cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was buried. 
14. PlaintiflF should pay the debt owing Thomas W. Sorensen and Defendant 
should pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G. Anderson, M.D. 
15. Defendant's maiden name, Marchand, should be restored and she should 
henceforth be known as Marjorie Marchand. 
16. Defendant is entitled to judgment against the PlaintiflF for the use and benefit 
of her attorney in the sum of $1,000.00. 
DATED this 
Approved as to form: 
KELLIE E WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this f 5»-4 day of December, 1994, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Kellie F. Williams 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main, #1400 
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TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT F. ASTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARGIE M. ASTIN, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 934402059 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the court 
on the 2nd day of September, 1994, and continuing into the 6th day of September, 1994, and 
Plaintiff being present with his counsel, Robert L. Moody, and Defendant being present with 
her counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the coun having heard evidence and having made its ruling 
from the bench regarding vehicles, home, insurance, taxes, burial plot and doctor bills, and 
having made its written memorandum decision with regard to alimony and attorneys fees after 
counsel submitted proposed findings of fact and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from the Defendant and 
Defendant is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from the Plaintiff, the same to become final 
upon the signing and entry in the registry of actions. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child 
of the parties, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978, subject to the right of the Defendant to 
visit with said child at reasonable times and places. 
3. Defendant is not ordered to pay child support since Plaintiff is receiving 
$189.00 per month Social Security benefits due to Defendant's disability. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the Defendant as alimony, the sum of 
$600.00 per month, commencing in the month of October 1994 and continuing on a monthly 
basis until the further order of the court. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the home of the 
parties until such time as the minor child graduates from high school with her class or reaches 
the age of 18, whichever occurs last. At such time, the home of the parties shall be sold at the 
highest price available and, after paying the mortgage payments and the debts and obligations 
existing at the time of the parties' separation, the then net equity should be divided equally 
between the parties. 
6. The debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation include 
the following, with the following amounts: 
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Creditor Balance 
1. Dr. Thomas Sorensen $ 2,159.00 
2. First Security Bank (1st mortgage) 31,169.00 
3. First Security Bank (home equity loan) 30,049.00 
4. Sears 1,503.00 
5. Credit Card Center (Visa) 2,857.00 
6. Credit Card Center (MasterCard) 2,959.00 
7. First Interstate Bank (MasterCard) 1,215.00 
7. Each of the parties is hereby awarded the personalty now in their respective 
possessions, but that the following adjustments are ordered to be made: 
a. Plaintiff is ordered to return to the Defendant the little table and two 
chairs from the kitchen; the radio/gift; knives and holder (if Plaintiff has the same); sewing 
equipment (if any that Plaintiff has); toilet cover; shower rod; Christmas things (train, flowers, 
Santa holders, if Plaintiff has them); newest brown weekend case (if Plaintiff has it); desk and 
such school books and supplies that Plaintiff may have associated with said desk in Chris' old 
bedroom; crafts and quilts that Marge made (if Plaintiff has them); and Plaintiff should make 
his every best effort to have Defendant's handgun returned from his sister and deliver the same 
to Defendant; Defendant's Book of Remembrance; and make available all family pictures in his 
possession to the Defendant for copying and, after said copying, Defendant is ordered to return 
the same to the Plaintiff. 
b. Defendant is ordered to return to the Plaintiff, the following: temple 
clothing; missionary memorabilia (if Defendant has); any and all pictures and family 
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memorabilia that Defendant has is ordered to be made available to Plaintiff for copying and, 
upon copying, the Plaintiff is to return the same to Defendant. 
8. It is hereby ordered that each party is entitled to one-half of the retirement 
benefits through the Prudential Insurance Group. 
9. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child as an 
exemption for income tax purposes. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the 1989 Oldsmobile shall be the property of the 
Plaintiff and the 1985 Dodge Truck shall be the property of the Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered 
to pay to the Defendant the sum of $975.00 to equalize the values of the vehicles. The parties 
are ordered to sell the inoperable 1987 Mercury at whatever price it can be sold for with the 
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. 
11. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance on his life and that 
the beneficiaries shall remain the same. It is further ordered that the life insurance policy, 
contract number 70810865, in which Defendant has incidents of ownership, shall be and are 
hereby awarded to the Defendant and Plaintiff is ordered to restore one-half of the value of any 
and all loans that he has made against said policy without the Icnowledge or permission of the 
Defendant. Defendant is ordered to be responsible for making any and all premiums on said 
policy henceforth. 
12. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to make available to the Defendant one of the two 
burial plots in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was 
buried. 
memorabilia that Defendant has is ordered to be made available to Plaintiff for copying and, 
upon copying, the Plaintiff is to return the same to Defendant. 
8. It is hereby ordered that each party is entitled to one-half of the retirement 
benefits through the Prudential Insurance Group. 
9. It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child as 
an exemption for income tax purposes. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the 1989 Oldsmobile shall be the property of the 
Plaintiff and the 1985 Dodge Truck shall be the property of the Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered 
to pay to the Defendant the sum of $975.00 to equalize the values of the vehicles. The parties 
are ordered to sell th e inoperable 1987 Mercury at whatever price it can be sold for with the 
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. 
11. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance on his life and that 
the beneficiaries shall remain the same. It is further ordered that the life insurance policy, 
contract number 70810865, in which Defendant has incidents of ownership, shall be and are 
hereby awarded to the Defendant and Plaintiff is ordered to restore one-half of the value of any 
and all loans that he has made against said policy without the knowledge or permission of the 
Defendant. Defendant is ordered to be responsible for making any and all premiums on said 
policy henceforth. 
12. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to make available to the Defendant one of the two 
burial plots in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was 
buried. 
13. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the debt owing to Thomas W. Sorensen and 
Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G. Anderson, M.D. 
14. Plaintiffs maiden name is hereby restored and she shall henceforth be known 
as Marjorie Marchand. 
15. Defendant is hereby awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of 
$1,000.00 towards Defendant's attorneys fees 
Approved as to form 
Kellie F. Williams 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 21 day ofT^ecemSet, 1994, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kellie R Williams 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main, #1400 
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CASE NO. 934402059 
DATE October 7, 1994 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
This matter came before the Court for trial on September 2 and 4, 1994. The 
plaintiff was present with counsel Robert Moody. Defendant was present with counsel Kellie 
Williams. The parties and witness Dr. David Bennion were sworn and testified. The Court 
received Exhibits 1 through 8. Exhibit 9, defendant's financial statement, was not admitted 
but was made part of the file. Exhibit 10 was received, as were Exhibits 12 through 14 and 
16 through 19. The Court granted the parties a divorce from one another on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, to become final upon the signing and entry of the decree. The 
Court made its ruling from the bench regarding the vehicles, home, insurance, taxes, burial 
plot, and doctor bills. The Court ruled that defendant may have restored to her the name she 
has requested of Maijorie Marchant. The Court took under advisement the matters of 
alimony and attorney's fees. The Court ordered Counsel to submit proposed findings of fact. 
These documents were received from counsel for both parties on September 21, 1994. 
The Court, having heard testimony and oral arguments and having reviewed the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully informed in the premises 
and having reviewed the applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
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1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. The parties were married on April 
12, 1962, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and 
has been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. These findings and conclusions are limited to alimony and attorney's fees. All 
other findings and conclusions were given from the bench. 
3. Pursuant to a temporary order by Judge Steven Hansen of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court on January 20, 1994, plaintiff has been paying defendant $1,000.00 per month 
in temporary support. 
4. Defendant currently resides with her sister, but wants to become independent and 
move into a home or apartment of her own despite her fear, expressed at trial, of living 
alone. Should she do so, her monthly expenses, given at trial as $1,372.00, would increase. 
5. Defendant receives $429.00 per month in social security disability benefits. She 
has been diagnosed as having depression and multiple personality disorder, both of which are 
difficult to treat. Furthermore, defendant had a coronary bypass surgery in 1993. Defendant 
is taking a variety of medications. So long as defendant is insured, her average monthly 
expense for prescription co-payments is $76.19; without insurance, defendant's average 
monthly expense for prescriptions would be $385.23. See Exhibit 10. Defendant is 
currently insured under a COBRA plan, which is good for only three years, at which time 
defendant may be uninsurable. Defendant's monthly COBRA health insurance premium is 
$300.00. Although defendant is eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible 
upon receiving alimony. 
6. Dr. David Bennion testified at trial that in his opinion defendant is currently 
incapable of earning a living, although this could change if a proper treatment is found. 
7. Plaintiff is employed by Prudential Insurance Company of America as an insurance 
salesman and acts as an independent broker for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Utah, Gem 
Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. His taxable income for the past 
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three years was as follows: (a) $44,839.00 in 1993; (b) $63,074.00 in 1992; and (c) 
$49,062.00 in 1991. See Exhibits 1-3, 6. In 1991 plaintiff suffered a heart attack and had a 
triple bypass surgery. Plaintiffs current health status is fair, but he testified at trial that he 
now lacks the drive and energy to pursue insurance sales as actively as in the past. 
Consequently, plaintiff argues that any award of alimony should be based upon his current 
reduced earning capacity. 
8. Plaintiff argues that his 1991 income tax return included the sick pay resulting from 
his triple bypass surgery but that his insurance earnings were withheld and carried over into 
1992, resulting in an additional $19,100.00 in 1992. Plaintiff further argues that this amount 
should be deducted from his 1992 earnings, leaving only $43,974.00 taxable income for 
1992. When this is averaged with plaintiffs taxable income from 1991 and 1993, the result 
is approximately $46,000.00, or $3,000.00 per month. Plaintiff asserts that his net average 
monthly income, after taxes, is $2,313.00. See plaintiffs Proposed Findings Of Fact at 3, K 
3. Plaintiff further argues that this amount should be reduced by job expenses of $655.00 
per month and child support of $376.00. Id. at 2-3. This would leave a net monthly 
income of only $1,282.00. 
9. The parties' minor child, Emily, is entitled to approximately $189.00 per month 
from social security disability benefits, due to defendant's disabilities. Because Emily resides 
with plaintiff, this amount is paid to plaintiff. In addition, one grandchild and two of the 
parties' adult children reside with plaintiff. Plaintiff receives no contributions to household 
expenses from the adult children residing with him, and only one of those children is 
currently employed. The total of monthly expenses plaintiff enumerated in his Proposed 
Findings Of Fact at 4, f 6, is $1,900.00. 
10. While testifying at trial plaintiff suggested that, given his present monthly income 
and expenditures, he felt he would be capable of paying defendant an amount of alimony 
between $300.00 and $400.00 per month. 
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11. Defendant argues that any award of alimony should be based upon the average 
monthly gross amount earned by plaintiff over the past three years. See defendant's 
Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law at 4, f 3. Should the Court agree, the 
amount of alimony determined in this maimer would be $1,215.00 per month. Id. at 6, S 7. 
12. Defendant also seeks attorney fees and costs in the amount of $3,579.00. This is 
based upon a calculation of 19.25 hours at a rate of $150.00 per hour, and $300.00 total 
driving time. 
13. In determining whether alimony should be awarded and what amount of alimony is 
appropriate, the Court must "consider each of the following three factors: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support." Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). Defendant's 
financial condition and needs justify an award of alimony, as defendant has considerable 
medical expenses and her only income consists of her monthly social security disability 
payment of $429.00. Defendant appears to be incapable of earning her own living in the 
foreseeable future, whereas plaintiff is earning sufficient income to allow him to support 
himself, the parties' minor child, and several adult children. 
14. Under Utah law, a child age 18 or older is a legal adult. U.C.A. § 15-2-1. A 
parent's statutory duty to support a child, see U.C.A. §§ 78-45-3 and 78-45-4, ceases when 
the child turns 18, unless that child "is incapacitated from earning a living and is without 
sufficient means." U.C.A. § 78-54-2(4). Plaintiffs desire to support and assist his adult 
children is to be encouraged, see Harding v. Harding. 488 P.2d 308 (Utah 1971); however, 
plaintiff is not legally required to support his adult children currently residing with him. 
A situation similar to the case now before the Court existed in Englert v. Englert, 
576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978), a divorce case in which the defendant father had been providing 
monthly payments to his 25-year-old son. There the Utah Supreme Court held that, because 
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there was no evidence that the son was disabled or limited in his ability to support himself, 
any contribution made by the father to the son was voluntary and did not justify any 
reduction in the amount of alimony he was ordered to pay to his former wife. Id. at 1275. 
The court further held that the defendant had no legal obligation to maintain life insurance on 
himself with his adult son as a beneficiary, and that such an obligation existed only as to the 
parties' minor daughter, and only until she reached the age of 18 years. Id. at 1276. 
Furthermore, in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that, when 
making an award of alimony, including expenses related to grandchildren would be 
tantamount to giving a child support award for the grandchildren, and a grandparent has no 
statutory or common law duty to provide support for his grandchildren. Id. at 546. 
Accordingly, the court there held that expenses related to the parties' grandchildren were not 
relevant to, nor to be considered in, the award of alimony or child support. Id. Any award 
of alimony, particularly after a marriage of long duration and to the extent possible, is 
intended to equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. See Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the 
wife, not to reward her or to inflict a penalty upon the husband. See English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
Based upon these cases, the Court finds that plaintiffs voluntary support of the 
parties' adult children and their grandchild should not be a factor in determining the 
appropriate amount of alimony awarded to defendant. 
15. This was a marriage of 32 years. Defendant has devoted a large portion of her life 
to the marriage, and an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court finds it appropriate to 
base the amount of alimony on plaintiffs recent historical earnings, since such income 
reflects both the plaintiffs earning ability and the limitations thereon resulting from his 1991 
heart attack and bypass surgery. 
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16. Plaintiffs alleges that his 1992 earnings should be reduced by $19,100.00, the 
amount of his insurance earnings for 1991 that plaintiff claims were withheld and carried 
over into 1992. The Court agrees with plaintiffs argument that the $19,100.00 should be 
deducted from his earnings completely as being unusual income. Plaintiffs 1992 income 
reflects sick pay received as a result of plaintiffs incapacitation by reason of triple bypass 
surgery, which prohibited his employer from applying the $19,100.00 renewal income to 
plaintiffs 1991 income. As a result, plaintiffs 1992 income is disproportionate to his actual 
earnings. When the $19,100.00 is deducted from plaintiffs 1992 earnings, his average 
annual income from 1991 through 1993 is found to be $45,958.33, giving plaintiff an 
average monthly income of $3,829.36. 
Plaintiff alleges that job expenses averaging $7,865.00 annually ($655.00 per 
month) should be backed out of his gross monthly wages because it would not show up on 
income taxes as gross income if he were an independent agent. Plaintiff testified of these 
monthly expenses, but did not break them down as to what they covered, nor did plaintiffs 
attorney address this in plaintiffs Proposed Findings Of Fact. However, in 1991, 1992, and 
1993, plaintiff filed Form 2106 along with his internal revenue tax return, alleging employee 
business expenses. This Court finds that plaintiff does have employee business expenses 
necessarily incurred in the production of plaintiffs monthly income, and further finds that 
these expenses appear exaggerated. The Court will allow one-half of such expenses, or 
$328.00 per month, as a reduction against plaintiffs gross income for determination of his 
net income for the purpose of determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to 
defendant. Plaintiff is not an independent agent, and does not assume the same risks and 
expenses as an independent agent, and the Court has therefore reduced the monthly employee 
business expense claimed by plaintiff. The Court must take the parties as it finds them; 
accordingly, the Court will deduct these job expenses from plaintiffs average monthly 
income and finds plaintiffs average gross monthly income to be $3,501.36. An average of 
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plaintiffs income withholding for federal, state, and social security taxes during the years 
1991 through 1993 is $874.72. See W-2 forms in Exhibits 1-3. After deducting this amount 
from plaintiffs average gross monthly income, the Court finds plaintiffs net average 
monthly income to be $2,626.64. 
17. Plaintiff has testified his monthly expenses are $3,846.00, although these expenses 
were not itemized. The Court notes that plaintiff is currently supporting one grandchild and 
several adult children in addition to supporting himself and the parties' minor child. 
Plaintiffs monthly expenses would be less if he were only providing for himself and the 
parties' minor child. Because plaintiff is legally obligated to support only minor children 
from the marriage, the Court finds that plaintiffs stated monthly expenses can and should be 
reduced when determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to defendant. In examining 
plaintiffs monthly obligations as identified in his Proposed Findings Of Fact at 4, f 6, they 
appear to total only $1,900.00. When this amount is deducted from plaintiffs net average 
monthly income of $2,626.64, infra ^ 16, plaintiff is found to have $726.64 remaining. The 
Court and all parties understand these dollar calculations are never precise, and it is 
impossible to come up with a perfect solution. 
18. The Court has not attempted to calculate child support for the parties' minor child 
based on the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the child receives social security in 
the amount of $189.00 per month as a result of defendant's disability. Since defendant is not 
in a position to contribute any sum for child support, the Court finds and concludes that the 
amount coming from social security, together with defendant's obligation to support the 
minor child, is significantly reflected in plaintiffs monthly expenses. For these reasons, an 
independent amount of child support has not been considered when determining the parties' 
monthly expenses or the amount of alimony awarded to defendant. 
19. In considering defendant's future needs, the Court is more concerned that 
defendant have sufficient income to provide for her medical needs and is less concerned with 
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defendant's desire to be financially able to establish herself in her own home. The medical 
problems and expenses associated with aging alone often restrict the activities people would 
like to do, and defendant's mental disabilities would understandably place additional practical 
and financial restrictions on her, whether the parties were married or divorced. Based upon 
plaintiffs net average monthly income of $2,984.64 and defendant's net average monthly 
income of $429.00, and based upon the parties' needs and responsibilities, the Court now 
finds that a reasonable amount of alimony would be $600.00 per month. Accordingly, 
plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay $600.00 per month to defendant as alimony. 
20. In her Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, defendant argues that 
each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all monthly health insurance premiums and 
one-half of all uncovered medical expenses incurred after the expiration of defendant's 
COBRA insurance coverage, if she is unable to secure other health insurance. Whether 
defendant will be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA insurance 
coverage is a matter of speculation, and the Court will not address this issue at this time. 
Should this possibility become reality, defendant may petition the Court for a modification of 
the divorce decree based upon a material change of circumstances. 
21. As to defendant's claim for attorney fees and court costs in the amount of 
$3,579.00, the Court notes that defendant has not submitted an affidavit regarding her 
attorney's hourly rates, the total number of hours expended on this case, or the itemization of 
how much attorney time was expended on the various matters related to this case. In fact, 
defendant has had several attorneys representing her throughout the course of this divorce, 
and the Court has no evidence before it as to whether the amount of attorney fees sought is 
the amount incurred solely by defendant's current attorney or the total amount incurred by all 
the attorneys who have represented defendant at various stages of the proceedings. 
An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. See Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). Any such 
award must be based on the "reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as the financial 
need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Id. (citing Rasband 
v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988)). See, e.g.. Morgan v. Morgan. 854 
P.2d 559, 570 (Utah Appl), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 942 (Utah 1993); Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 
489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); and Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). It 
is readily determined that neither plaintiff nor defendant has the ability to pay significant 
attorney fees. Although the plaintiff is obligated for his own attorney fees, the Court finds 
plaintiff should contribute to defendant's attorney fees in the sum of $1,000.00. Plaintiff is 
hereby ordered to pay $1,000.00 to defendant for attorney fees. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce consistent with the terms of this decision and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 7th day of October, 1994. 
BY^fffii) C O U R T S ^ ^ 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Robert L. Moody 
Kellie F. Williams 
